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Abstract
We explore a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents stochas-
tically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing per-
turbed best{response, we assume that agents follow a rule of \switching to better strategies
more likely". We relate this behavior to work of Rosenthal (1989) and Schlag (1998). Our
main results are that both strict Nash equilibria of the coordination game correspond to
stationary distributions of the process, hence evolution of play is not ergodic, but instead de-
pends on initial conditions. However, coordination on the risk{dominant equilibrium occurs
with probability one whenever the initial share of agents playing the risk{dominant strategy
has at least some positive measure, how ever small, within the whole population.
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cation: C72
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1. Introduction
The seminal work of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), henceforth denoted as KMR, and Young
(1993) has attracted much interest in evolutionary models for equilibrium selection in coordination
games. Subsequent models have rened this work by introducing local interaction (e.g., Ellison,
1993; Blume, 1993, 1995), or by enlarging the strategy space of an agent (Ely, 1995; Bhaskar and
Vega-Redondo, 1997; Kim and Sobel, 1995). The present paper belongs to the rst category in
featuring local interaction. It follows a new line in studying alternative ideas for modelling the
individual behavior of an agent.
The usual story in the evolutionary approach is that there is a large population of agents,
each facing a situation of repeated interaction with other agents. The interaction is modelled as a
symmetric 2  2 coordination game where agents are restricted to pure strategies. The evolution
of play within the population is driven by the assumption that agents may switch strategies.
Since opponents may change their strategy, too, each agent repeatedly plays the coordination
game against a changing mixture of strategies. An agents task is to adjust his strategy to the
environment he faces.
The original assumption of KMR (1993) and Young (1993) is that agents adjust their strategy
by playing perturbed best{response. With high probability they play a best{response to their
environment, with remaining low probability they simply play random. The rst part is based on
the idea that agents are inuenced by payo dierences, the second part captures noisy behavior
and models, e.g., individual mistakes or deliberate experimentation of an agent. Based on this
assumption the surprisingly strong result is that evolution selects the risk{dominant equilibrium
as dened by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).1
Perhaps the strongest objection to this result has been formulated by Bergin and Lipman
(1996) who show that the equilibrium selection result is based on the specic assumption that
random play is suciently similar in dierent states of the process. In fact they show that, if
one allows the noise rate to depend on the state of the process then every invariant distribution
of the noiseless process and thus every strict Nash equilibrium of the coordination game can be
selected.2
One possible way to proceed is to make the noise part explicit by modelling the economic,
social, or psychological source of it. A recent approach in this direction is van Damme and
Weibull (1998), where agents rationally choose to make mistakes because it is too costly to avoid
these mistakes completely. The resulting endogenous noise rates are shown to be suciently
similar across states, which establishes the result of risk{dominance. An alternative is to leave the
1Papers in the second category mentioned above obtain the payo{dominant equilibrium, which is a result that
follows directly from the enlargement of the strategy space. See also our section 11.
2Blume (1994) argues in a similar way. He analyzes dierent versions of noise in order to nd criteria for
invariance of the selection result with respect to the noise process.
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paradigm of perturbed best{response behavior and choose a dierent model for agents' adjustment,
which nonetheless features important properties of the original approach. This is the way we
proceed in this paper.
Intuitively speaking, pure best{response adjustment says: adjust to best strategies with prob-
ability one. This holds true even if the other strategy earns only innitesimally larger payos.
Hence adjustment is very payo{sensitive and in fact deterministic. At any time t an agents
probability to change his strategy is either 1 if the other strategy is a best{response, 0 if not.
Our starting point is to study a smoothened version of best-response, which says: adjust to better
strategies more likely. In a static framework this simple intuitive idea is related to a model of
Rosenthal (1989).3 From a decision theoretic point of view it resembles much the behavioral no-
tion in proportional imitation as introduced by Schlag (1998), although we do not consider actual
imitation in this model.
The rst consequence of our assumption is that the strategy adjustment of an agent is less
payo{sensitive. Probabilities to switch lie within the whole interval [0; 1] rather than in the subset
f0; 1g. In eect, many times both strategies will have positive probability to be played. This
corresponds to the randomness eect of noise in perturbed best{response. However, the second
and main feature of our approach is that agents are still inuenced by payo dierences, which we
see as the essence of pure best{response behavior. While the latter assumes that innitesimally
small payo dierences are weighted in the same way as large payo dierences our assumptions
say that payo dierences matter the more the larger they are.
Based on this approach our main results show that agents are more likely to coordinate on
the risk{dominant equilibrium. In this sense our model supports the result of KMR (1993),
Young (1993), and others and moderates the critique of Bergin and Lipman (1996). However,
contrary to most other approaches, in our model the risk{dominated equilibrium still corresponds
to a stationary distribution of the stochastic process. In other words, the process is not ergodic
and, in fact, basins of attraction of both equilibria are non{empty. Thus, the question on which
equilibrium agents will actually coordinate depends on initial conditions. Note that this is true
under pure best{response adjustment as well. In order to obtain an equilibrium selection result
noise needs to be introduced, which turns the process into an ergodic process and eliminates one
of the two equilibria. This, however, produces a common paradox as it has been indicated, for
instance, by Blume (1993, p415). While the theory stated that all players will always choose the
risk{dominant strategy in the future, computer simulations showed
\that the outcome depends strongly on the initial conditions of the process. If the initial
frequency of down [i.e. the risk{dominated strategy] is suciently high, the process converges
to all players choosing down."
A contribution of our approach is to resolves this paradox, by answering the equilibrium
selection problem without necessarily eliminating one of the two equilibria.
3We are grateful to Bob Rosenthal for indicating us to this work.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the following section we dene our model of local inter-
action. Section 3 introduces the class of coordination games we want to look at. In section 4 the
idea of stochastic strategy adjustment is made precise and our two main behavioral assumptions
are formulated. In view of a better motivation these assumptions are related to other work in
section 5. Section 6 then pins down the model. Results are obtained and discussed in sections 7
to 10. Section 11 concludes.
2. Local Interaction
Similarly to other models (Blume 1993, 1995; Ellison, 1993) we consider a spatial model of local
interaction. Precisely, we assume an innite population of agents that are located on the n-
dimensional integer lattice Zn. The dimension of the lattice can have any value n  1. Results in
our model do not depend on n. By identifying each agent with his or her location the space Zn
represents the population of agents. Typically, agents will be denoted as x; y; z 2 Zn.
Every agent is assumed to interact with a nite set of other agents, his so{called neighbors.
For every agent x 2 Zn we dene the neighborhood to be given by N(x) := fy 2 Znj jy   xj = 1g
where j  j denotes the Euclidean distance within Zn. Thus neighbors are agents that are one step
away in at most one of n dimensions. Sometimes this kind of neighborhood interaction is also
called nearest neighbor interaction. If n equals one, neighbors are located both to the right and
to the left of an agent. For n = 2, the set of neighbors consists, in addition, of those agents that
are located to the top and to the bottom of an agent.
Of course, there are various other possibilities for dening appropriate neighborhood structures,
even if one sticks to the general assumption of an n-dimensional lattice. And intuition suggests
that dierent structures will support dierent outcomes. Important research therefore focuses on
robustness{checks with respect to dierent neighborhood structures. An early approach in this
direction has been made by Ellison (1993) in comparing global with local interaction. A recent
discussion of general neighborhood structures is given in Morris (1996) and Young (1998).
Yet, in this model we restrict our analysis to the nearest neighbor interaction as dened above.
The reason for doing this is simply that this neighborhood structure has already been studied
in other models, as well (Blume, 1993, 1995; Ellison, 1993). As we do not want to focus on
the role of the neighborhood structure itself, but rather on the behavior of agents within such
a neighborhood structure, this gives us the possibility to relate our ndings to those of others
without any confusion about possible dierences in underlying neighborhood structures. Our
main contribution shall be a check of robustness with respect to an agents behavior rather than
with respect to the considered neighborhood structure.
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3. Coordination Games
We consider the class of symmetric 2 2 coordination games that are given by the payo matrix
in Figure 1.
Top Bottom
Top a; a c; d
Bottom d; c b; b
Figure 1: A Coordination Game
We assume all values to be nite and both, a > d and b > c, hence (Top;Top) and
(Bottom;Bottom) are the two strict Nash equilibria of the game. There exists another symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, where both players put probability b c
a d+b c on strategy
Top. However, we are not going to focus on this equilibrium since we restrict players to play pure
strategies only.4
Time is modelled continuously. At any time t 2 IR+0 to each agent x 2 Z
n there is assigned one
of the two possible actions, Top, henceforth denoted by T , or Bottom, henceforth denoted by B.





where t(x) denotes the action of agent x at time t. A mapping t is also called a conguration.
Denote X the set of all possible congurations.
Agents continuously and uniformly interact with their neighbors. We assume that at any time
t each agent is sequentially matched with his 2n neighbors.5 In each single match the coordination
game is played with every agent choosing his assigned action. Denote for agent x 2 Zn by s(x; t)
the accumulated payo from these matches, when the play of the population, in particular of
his neighbors, is determined by conguration t and agent x plays strategy s 2 fT;Bg, hence





where G(; ) calculates the payo from the matrix in Figure 1.
4Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997) distinguish between cases where d  b and d < b. Games in the rst subclass
are called stag-hunt games, games in the second pure coordination games. Our results hold for both classes.
5In this paper we do not model the actual matching procedure but concentrate on accumulated payos.
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4. Stochastic Strategy Adjustment
In our model we pursue the idea that agents stochastically adjust their strategy to a changing
environment given by the play in their local neighborhood. We do not follow the usual approach
in the evolutionary literature that studies boundedly rational behavior by assuming rst best{
response adjustment which is then perturbed by some form of noise. Instead, we consider a simple
adjustment rule that connects probabilities to switch from one strategy to the other and payos
of both strategies directly. Roughly said, the main assumptions are the following (see below): (1)
agents stay with their strategy in case of successful coordination with their neighbors, (2) agents
are more likely to switch if the other strategy earns relatively higher payos.
Technically we model individual probabilities to adjust a strategy by so{called ip rates. These
rates are real{valued functions and determine the probability for an agent to switch (ip) to the
other strategy within an innitesimally short period of time. Precisely this works as follows.
Denote rs(x; t) 2 [0;1) the ip rate of agent x given the state of the population t with x himself
playing strategy s. Then for  # 0 it holds that
Prob[t+(x) 6= s] = r
s(x; t)   + o(): (2)
Thus, given t, for innitesimally short periods of time the probability for agent x to adjust his
strategy within that period from s 2 fT;Bg to the complementary strategy sC equals the product
of the ip rate rs(x; t) times the length of the time period.
The next two assumptions give the restrictions we want to make on an agent's adjustment.
Assumption 1 (Nash equilibrium) Flip rates are zero if and only if all agents in the neigh-
borhood coordinate on the same strategy, i.e. agents play a Nash equilibrium. Precisely, for any
x 2 Zn; t 2 X; s 2 fT;Bg
rs(x; t) = 0 , 8y 2 N(x) : t(y) = s: (3)
Assumption 2 (Flips to better strategies are more likely) Flip rates depend on payo
dierences in a linear monotonic way. The higher the relative payo advantage of a strategy
the larger the rate to ip to this strategy. Precisely, for any x 2 Zn; t 2 X
rB(x; t)  r
T (x; t) = (
T (x; t)  
B(x; t)); (4)
where 0 <  <1.
Assumption 1 captures the idea that individual learning forces are weak at Nash equilibria of
the game. If no single neighboring opponent plays the other strategy, this other strategy is not a
best{response to any of the neighbors' currently played strategy. Hence there is no reason to play
that other strategy. Thus ip rates are zero. In this situation an agent's behavior coincides with
pure best{response behavior.
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Assumption 2 is the important behavioral assumption in our model. It is motivated by the idea
that agents do not over{sensitively react to changes in their local environment by always adjusting
their strategy towards best{responses with probability one. Instead, agents are assumed to follow
a rule of adjusting towards better strategies more likely. The larger the payo dierence between
the other strategy and the current strategy is the more likely it is to ip to the other strategy.
The sensitivity of this relation is governed by the parameter , which we assume to be nite.6
The larger  the more sensitive the adjustment with respect to payo dierences. Since payos in
the underlying coordination game are nite as well, ip rates are always nite. This ensures, by
(2), that agents are locked in for innitesimally short periods of time. During these time periods
they are `programmed' to the chosen strategy as mentioned above.
Note that under Assumption 2 the probability to ip is not necessarily zero whenever the payo
of the other strategy is less than the one that is currently earned. Assumption 1 says that if there
is at least one neighbor who plays the other strategy there is also a strictly positive probability for
the respective agent to switch to that strategy, even if it makes him worse o. Yet by Assumption
2 it follows that after he has switched to a bad strategy the probability to switch back again to
the good strategy is always higher than the one before.
A feature of our approach is that with probability zero two agents ip at exactly the same
time. Hence, individual strategy adjustments are non{synchronized, which allows us to ignore the
eects of simultaneous strategy revision.
5. Relation to Other Work
In a static framework Rosenthal (1989) has studied an idea similar to our approach. For general
two person games with nite numbers of strategies the author explores a solution concept where,
instead of playing best{responses with probability one, players use \better responses with proba-
bilities not lower than worse responses" (op.cit., p274). Using a notation similar to ours this idea
can be made precise as follows. Let pi and pj denote the probabilities with which a player intends
to use his strategies i and j. Let i and j denote the payos of strategies i and j given some
chosen strategy of the other player. Then Rosenthal assumes that if pi > 0 and pj > 0
pi   pj = (i   j); (5)
where  is a nite parameter playing the same role as in our model. Comparing equation (5) to our
Assumption 2 shows that our model can in fact be seen as a dynamic version of Rosenthal's model
of boundedly rational behavior. Instead of relating static choice probabilities to payo dierences
we assume that probabilities to change a strategy are connected to corresponding dierences in
payos.
6Note that  = 1 would correspond to a pure best{response scenario since (2) shows that a ip rate equal to
innity implies an instantaneous adjustment if the other strategy earns a larger payo.
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If we look at an agent's problem from a decision theoretic point of view, the idea of Assumption
2 is also closely related to the notion of a proportional imitation rule as introduced by Schlag (1998).
There an imitation rule is called proportional if the dierence in probabilities of switching from
strategy i to strategy j and vice versa is proportional to the payo dierence between strategies i
and j. In Schlag's model payos are determined via a multi{armed bandit and an agent can learn
other strategies and payos by sampling other agents. He then (randomly) decides to imitate, i.e.
switch to the other agent's strategy, or not. This is, of course, dierent to our model since agents
do not imitate, nor do they observe other agents' payos. Still, given an agent's information
about his current strategy's payo and the payo of another strategy (be it via sampling or
by own calculation) our main assumptions coincide in the sense that probabilities to switch are
proportional to the dierence in payos between both strategies.
6. Definition of Flip Rates
In order to bring Assumptions 1 and 2 into being recall the payo matrix of the underlying
coordination game (Figure 1). Given a conguration t the payo agent x earns from playing
strategy T or B can be computed as


















Hence payo dierences are equal to
T (x; t)  
B(x; t) = (a  d)N
T (x; t)   (b  c)N
B(x; t); (8)
where N ŝ(x; t) gives the number of agent x's neighbors who play strategy ŝ when the state of the
population is determined by conguration t.
In view of Assumptions 1 and 2 there are still many possibilities to dene ip rates, as they
leave some degrees of freedom. The rst assumption gives boundary conditions while the second
one xes relative values only. We will stick to the simplest version possible, which is based on
dierences as given in equation (8).
Denition 1 (Stochastic Strategy Adjustment) For x 2 Zn and t 2 X dene
rB(x; t) = (a  d)N
T (x; t); (9)
rT (x; t) = (b  c)N
B(x; t); (10)
where 0 <  <1 and a; b; c; d are payos in the coordination game.
7
Denition 1 is a clear aggregation of Assumptions 1 and 2. Flip rates are zero whenever all
neighbors of x play the same strategy as x. For every conguration t the dierence between ip
rates equals the dierence of payos times the sensitivity parameter .
Note that our assumptions imply that every additional neighbor that plays the other strategy
increases the probability to switch to that strategy by a value equal to the equilibrium payo of
that strategy, and simultaneously decreases the probability by a value equal to the o{equilibrium
payo of that strategy. The increase can be seen as corresponding to the possibility to earn the
equilibrium payo after a switch to that strategy. The decrease of the probability is then related
to a simultaneous loss of the o{equilibrium payo that is currently earned. In this sense factors
(a  d) and (b  c) capture revenue minus opportunity cost of adjusting from one strategy to the
other. Of course, since agents play a coordination game these terms are always positive. Thus,
if there is at least one neighbor playing the other strategy, the probability of switching to that
strategy is positive, as well. However, the concrete likelihood of an actual switch is determined
by the magnitude of these terms.
This suggests that we have to distinguish between two cases, either (a   d) = (b   c) or
(a  d) > (b  c).7 In the rst case we are in a symmetric situation. The probability of switching
depends just on the number of neighbors that play the other strategy, equally weighted for both
strategies. In the language of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) this case is equivalent to saying that both
equilibria are equally risky while if (a  d) > (b  c) strategy prole (T; T ) is the risk{dominant
equilibrium. In our model (a  d) > (b  c) implies that we are in an asymmetric situation, where
strategy T is weighted more strongly, which may suggest already the direction of play within our
population. We will restrict attention to this case for the rest of this paper. However, before we
do so, we quickly want to mention its relation to the symmetric case.
Using common results from the theory of interacting particle systems (see Liggett (1985) for
a good introduction) it can easily be shown that ip rates in Denition 1 dene a unique Markov
process ftgt0 on the state space of all congurations X. In the following we call this process the
adjustment process. In the symmetric case, where (a   d) = (b   c), the behavior of this process
is equivalent to the behavior of the so{called voter model, which was introduced independently
by Cliord and Sudbury (1973) and Holley and Liggett (1975). In the asymmetric case, where
(a  d) > (b  c), the process is equivalent to the so{called biased voter model. This process was
rst considered by Schwartz (1977) and later by Bramson & Grieath (1980, 1981). Bramson
& Grieath looked for results concerning the evolution of the process to describe the possible
spread of cancerous cells, an approach that was introduced by Williams & Bjerknes (1972), while
Schwartz was more interested in the duality theory of a larger class of Markov processes.
We now turn to an analysis of the evolution of play when agents adjust according to Denition
1 and (a  d) > (b  c).
7The case (a  d) < (b  c) is equivalent to the case (a   d) > (b  c) by changing names of the strategies.
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7. The Sensitivity Parameter 
Since the behavior of the adjustment process is equivalent to that of the biased voter model results
on the former follow from results on the latter. We therefore skip a reproduction of corresponding
proofs and instead provide an intuition.
The rst observation is that as long as  is nite its value plays no role for the long run
behavior (t =1) of the process.
Proposition 1 For  <1 the long run behavior of the adjustment process is independent of .
Proof: The claim follows immediately from the fact that a change of  simply results into a change
of the time scale and that properties concerning long run behavior (t = 1) are independent of
the time scale. 2
In the short and in the medium run the value of  does, of course, play a big role for the
behavior of the process. For example, the expected number of agents that play strategy T at
any nite time t0 does depend on the concrete value of . Low values of  create high inertia
within the adjustment of an agent, while high values speed up the evolution of play. However,
since technically any eects of a change of  correspond to a rescaling of time, a change has no
qualitative implications. Convergence is the same for every nite .8 Since we will focus on long
run behavior of the process only we normalize  = 1.
8. Clustering
One of the most important problems is, of course, the characterization of the set of invariant
distributions of the adjustment process ftgt0, since these will be the only possible limiting
distributions for the process. Obviously, the prominent measures B and T that correspond to
the strict Nash equilibria (B;B) and (T; T ), concentrating on the states where everybody plays
B (denoted as B) and everybody plays T (denoted as T) respectively, are both invariant. So the
process will never be ergodic. Once the process is in one of these states it will never leave it again
as they are both absorbing states.
This fact corresponds to the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993), and others before intro-
ducing mutations. With pure best{response behavior either states where the whole population
plays one of the two strict Nash equilibria are absorbing states. Only after the noise component
is added a selection between these states occurs. In our model, as we will see, a selection occurs
already on the basis of stochastic strategy adjustment.
8In this sense the parameter works in a similar way as the inertia parameter  in the learning model of Hart
and Mas-Colell (1997).
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Certainly also every convex combination of B and T is invariant as in general the set of
invariant distributions is a compact convex set. So the question is, if besides B and T there
exists any other extreme invariant distribution  for the process. The answer is given in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The only extreme invariant distributions of the adjustment process ftgt0 are B
and T , that concentrate on B and T, respectively.
The key to Proposition 2 lies in the analysis of the so{called dual process.9 For the adjustment
process this process is a continuous time particle jump process on Zn where each particle jumps
with rate (b  c) to a neighboring site and also produces a particle in an unoccupied site with a
rate equal to (a  d)  (b  c). If a particle attempts to occupy a site that is already occupied the
two particles coalesce. The result then follows from Schwartz (1977) who has shown that whenever
the dual process of a Markov process on X is monotone and fulls a certain growth condition,
then any invariant distribution must be a convex combination of the two measures B and T .
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Let ft gt0 be the adjustment process that starts with initial distribution  and let t denote
the distribution of that process at time t. An immediate consequence of Proposition 2 is that if
limt!1 t exists, the process clusters, that is for any x; y 2 Z
n the probability of ft (x) 6= 

t (y)g
converges to 0 as t goes to innity. Thus, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The only long run congurations are those where all agents coordinate on one of the
two Nash equilibria.
Since long run congurations are homogenous the next question is, on which equilibriumagents
will coordinate more likely. In other words, for which initial distributions will agents coordinate
on the risk{dominant equilibrium? The answer to these questions will give the desired selection
result.
9. Coordination on the Risk{Dominant Equilibrium
Note that invariant distributions of the adjustment process are translation invariant, where the
latter is dened as follows.
Denition 2 A probability measure  on X is translation invariant if for any nite collection of








(x1) = i1; : : : ; (xk) = ik

; (11)
9See Liggett (1985, chII) on duality for particle systems.
10In our setting a process is monotone if ip rates are increasing functions in the number of neighbors that play
`the other' strategy.
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i.e. probabilities do not depend on z.
Since the dynamics of the adjustment process are translation invariant as well, in the sense
that the assumed behavior is the same for every agent x 2 Zn, this suggests that the property of
translation invariance plays an important role in the model. The next result fully characterizes
convergence of play given it starts with a translation invariant distribution.
Proposition 3 Let the initial distribution  be translation invariant. Then
lim
t!1
t = B + (1   )T ; (12)
where  = (B).
The result in Proposition 3 is proved in several steps. The rst observation is that d
dt
t((x) =
T ) = ((a   d)   (b   c))
P
y2N(x) t((x) = B; (y) = T ). Since (a   d) > (b   c), the latter is
non{negative, hence the probability for playing T at time t is non{decreasing in t. Since t 2 [0; 1],
it must converge and consequently, the process clusters. The fact that  = (B) follows from
the translation invariance of  and hence of t, which implies that (B) = t(B). See Schwartz
(1977) for details.
Equation (12) nicely states the long run eects of interaction in our model. In general, any
limiting distribution must be a convex combination of the two measures B and T . Now for a
translation invariant distribution  the parameter  that determines the mixture between these
measures is already uniquely determined by the value (B), which is the probability that all agents
initially start with playing strategy B. Once this probability is zero we obtain convergence to T .
On the other hand, convergence to B is obtained only in the case where the process starts already
in that particular state, i.e. (B) = 1. This is a quite substantial result which is reformulated in
the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If the initial distribution of the process is translation invariant, and almost surely
at least one agent plays strategy T at the beginning, then with probability one agents coordinate on
the risk{dominant equilibrium.
As an example for the last result consider the process that starts with initial distribution ,
being the Bernoulli product measure with parameter  where for each agent x 2 Zn; ((x) =
T ) = : Certainly  is translation invariant. If  > 0; (B) = 0, hence agents will coordinate on
the risk{dominant equilibrium. While the state of the population at the beginning is characterized
by individual independence, in the long run the evolution of the process in time eventually leads
to complete unanimity. More than that, all players eventually agree to coordinate on the risk{
dominant equilibrium. The driving force that makes this coordination possible is the adjustment
mechanism determined by the interaction between players. Even though this interaction is locally
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restricted to the neighborhood of a player, because of the considerable overlap between these
neighborhoods its eect is on the population as a whole.
Remark: The above result is an immediate implication of (a  d) > (b  c), i.e. strategy T being
risk{dominant. Denote  = a d
b c the ratio of these terms, measuring the degree of risk{dominance.
An important eect of  approaching 1, i.e. both equilibria becoming equally risky, is that the
expected waiting time for the process to hit any absorbing state, either T or B, can take very
large values. This result is due to Cox (1989) and holds for nite populations where, contrary
to the innite case, the probability to hit an absorbing state in nite time equals 1. Consider,
for example, a nite population of N agents located on the torus imbedded in the 2{dimensional
lattice Z2. Let the initial distribution of play be given by the nite version of  with  > 0. Then,
as  approaches 1, the expected waiting time to hit any equilibrium state tends to
2

N2 logN(  log    (1   ) log(1  ) (13)
as N becomes large.11 See Cox (1989) for more. Thus, when both equilibria are equally risky
and the population is large stochastic strategy adjustment needs very long waiting times until
the whole population coordinates on either of the Nash{equilibria, even though interaction is
restricted to local neighborhoods.
10. The Spread of Risk{Dominant Play
So far results have been obtained for the case when the initial state of the population may be
described by translation invariant distributions. It is interesting to see how risk{dominant play
spreads starting from an arbitrary set of agents that play strategy T at time zero. Here lies a
great advantage of any spatial model over those like KMR (1993) and Young (1993), where the
population is not endowed with a spatial structure and therefore the possibility to study a real
spread of a strategy is not given. Denote the set of agents that play T a time zero by A  Zn.
Obviously, a spread of risk{dominant play can occur only if the absorbing state B, where all agents
play B, is never reached. Let At be the adjustment process that starts with initial distribution
A, with A  Z
n, and let A denote the hitting time of the state B for the process At . The next
propositions calculates the probability for the process At to reach this state in nite time.




 jAj if A nite
0 if A innite;
(14)
where  = a d
b c .
11The order of limits in this statement is rst  # 1 and then N " 1.
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Since we are not aware of any proof of Proposition 4 we shall give a precise proof in the
appendix. The proposition shows that the probability to hit the absorbing state B in nite time
depends on the number of agents that play T at the beginning and the ratio of individual weights of
adjustment  = a d
b d . Since T is risk{dominant this ratio is always larger than 1. So the probability
decreases exponentially as the number of initial T{strategists grows. Note that the probability
does not depend on the spatial spread of A, i.e. how densely these agents are actually distributed
within the population. The only thing that matters is the cardinality of A. In particular, if A is
innite we obtain again almost sure coordination on the risk{dominant equilibrium.
In (14) the degree of risk{dominance, expressed by , directly enters the equation. The more
risk{dominant strategy T is, the faster the probability to enter the state B decreases as the size
of A grows. In the other direction, as both equilibria become equally risky ( approaches 1) the
probability to reach the equilibrium where everybody plays B tends to 1 for nite A.
Now suppose that strategy T is `very' risk{dominant in the sense that  >> 1. By Proposition
4, for large A the event fA =1g has overwhelming probability. Denote Dr = fx 2 Z
n : jxj  rg
the ball of radius r around the origin and let (At )  Z
n be the set of agents that play strategy T
given conguration At . The next proposition shows that, conditioned on f
A = 1g, strategy T
eventually spreads at least linearly. Thus again, if A is innite risk{dominant play almost surely
overtakes the whole population in a linear fashion.
Proposition 5 For every set A 6= ; of agents playing strategy T at time zero,
Prob[9t0 <1 8t  t0 Dt  (
A
t )j 
A =1] = 1: (15)
For a proof of Proposition 5 see Bramson and Grieath (1981), who also show that the constant
 depends only the dimension n and the parameter . It is instructive to compare the result to
a similar one in the equilibrium selection model of Hofbauer (1998). There, the author studies a
travelling wave approach to dene a spatially dominant equilibrium that is shown to coincide with
risk{dominance in symmetric 22 coordination games. A notable observation is that the speed of
his wave is closely related to the asymptotic growth of the set of T{players in our model. Consider,
for example the simple coordination game with o{equilibrium payos c and d equal to zero. Then







(Bramson and Grieath, 1981). The wave speed in Hofbauer (1998) using replicator






, where e captures an additional migration rate of
agents. In Hofbauer's model the population is distributed on the one-dimensional continuum IR.
Hence, taking the same dimension n = 1 in our model, risk{dominant play spreads at a similar
speed as in the model of Hofbauer. At the same time the underlying geometric structure of the
population is, of course, substantially dierent. This suggests that the result in Proposition 5
does not depend on the special structure of the space Zn as one might, perhaps, have suspected.
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11. Conclusion
We have studied a new form of strategy adjustment behavior by agents who repeatedly play a
symmetric 2  2 coordination game with local neighbors. Rather than considering perturbations
of pure best{response we focus on the original idea of best{response, which says that agents are
inuenced by payo dierences. We smooth this inuence by assuming that, instead of switching
to best responses with probability one, agents switch to better responses more likely. The under-
lying idea of this assumption corresponds to the bounded rationality model of Rosenthal (1989)
and the notion of proportional imitation of Schlag (1998). Based on a spatial model of local
interaction our results say that agents are in fact more likely to coordinate on the risk{dominant
equilibrium. In this sense our approach supports the results of KMR (1993), Young (1993), and
others. Precisely, in our model risk{dominant play prevails with probability one whenever the
initial fraction of agents that play the risk{dominant strategy has at least some positive mea-
sure. Since our population is located on the innite lattice Zn, this holds whenever the initial
fraction contains innitely many agents, independent of the spatial distribution of these agents.
This is obtained, e.g., by starting either with a corresponding Dirac measure or with independent
probability assignments to each player, where strategy T has at least some positive probability.
Our model shares with others the special feature that agents do not have the possibility to
inuence the set of opponents they face. Every agent interacts with a local neighborhood that
is exogenously given and remains xed forever. In contrast, Ely (1995) and Bhaskar and Vega-
Redondo (1997) have shown that once agents are allowed to choose their set of opponents the
situation looks totally dierent. They introduce a number of available locations where agents
can meet and exclusively play the game with each other. Thus the choice of a location directly
determines the set of opponents an agent is going to face. The eect is that agents will no longer
coordinate on the risk{dominant but instead choose the payo{dominant equilibrium.12
This suggest that results on equilibrium selection do not only depend upon the characteristics
of the noise process or the considered adjustment behavior of an agent but also, and perhaps even
more, on the specic kind of interaction that is assumed. In consequence, the next questions are:
once interaction structures are modelled endogenously, how do these structures evolve themselves?
What are the mechanisms that exist between playing specic strategies and interacting with
specic neighbors? How do these mechanisms work? Do strategies perhaps arise as a direct
consequence of interaction patterns? Or, in other words, do interaction patterns dene the (local)
environment in such a way that specic play can be observed that would not be observed if the
interaction patterns were dierent? Promising research in this direction is already started by
Morris (1996), Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998), and Young (1998).
12Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (1997) obtain the payo{dominant equilibrium for stag-hunt games and both
equilibria for pure coordination games. See our footnote 4.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the case when A is nite. If tm denotes the time of the m'th ip
of At , then R
A
m = jfx 2 Z
n






1 with prob. p
 1 with prob. 1   p;
and probabilities are p = 
+1
and 1  p = 1
+1





For b 2 IN dene the stopping time S = minm0fRAm =2 (0; b)g, i.e. the stopping time of the
rst moment the random walk leaves the interval (0; b). By the lemma of Borel-Cantelli it follows
that S is almost surely nite. Because of the positive drift  1
+1
towards innity, RAm is not a
martingale. Therefore dene the function h(x) = (1 p
p
)x. h(x) is a harmonic function with respect





m) is in fact a martingale and since Hm^S is clearly bounded we may use
the martingale stopping theorem to follow that E[HS ] = E[H0]. With p0 and pb, denoting the
probability for RAS to be 0 and b, respectively, this is equivalent to
p0h(0) + pbh(b) = h(jAj)














Now let the interval (0; b) grow to innity, then P [A <1] = limb!1 p0. Since the latter limes is
equal to (1 p
p
)jAj =  jAj, this proves the nite case.
The innite case now follows from the nite one by exhausting the space Zn via a sequence of
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